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tions by saying that the diplomatic representatives, their families, staff
or servants are subject to return to their own country for trial and
punishment while officers and employees of international organizations,
if granted immunity, would escape trial and punishment completely.' t
It should not be assumed that because the United Nations has no
tribunal for the trial and punishment of offenders that no effective action
can be taken by the United Nations against an employee who has violated the local law. The Secretary General has broad administrative
18
power and should be capable of dealing out adequate punishment.
If this method be found unworkable, it is suggested that the United
Nations set up a tribunal to try cases of violations by officers and employees of local law, and of violations of regulations of the organization
itself. There is ample power in Article 1419 and Article 2220 of the
United Nations Charter for the General Assembly to create such a
tribunal.
That there have been and will 'be abuses of these privileges and
immunities by officers and employees of international organizations cannot be doubted, but so necessary a rule must not be abandoned' because
of the derelictions of a few. To hold otherwise is to set a precedent
that conceivably might become an instrument of coercion toward the
international organization, its officers, or employees, by the national
state in which such organization functions.
DONALD W. McCoY.

Municipal Corporations-Taxation-Meaning of Public Purpose
"Taxes shall be levied only for public purposes" under Art. V, §3,
of the North Carolina Constitution.' Therefore, whether the project
"Westciester County v. Ranollo, 67 N. Y. S.. 2d 31, 34 (1946). (The
Court here refers to a case of "one Avenol in the Courts of the Republic of
France" as refusing to grant immunity to the Secretary General of the League of
Nations on a charge of non-support of his family. No citation is given and research has failed to disclose the case.) But cf. V.v. D -, 54 Clunt 1175
(1927) (a civil case in which immunity was recognized in the case of a permanent
delegate
League of
Nations).
"U. to
N.theCHARTm,
Art.
97, Art. 101. The request for immunity was withdrawn by the Security Officer of the United Nations by direction of Secretary
General
Lie. N. Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1946, p. 1, col. 6.
9
"Subject to the provisions of Art. 12, the General Assembly may recommend
measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which
it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations,
including situations resulting from a violation of the provisions of the present
Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations." U. N.
CHARTER, Art. 14.
. "'The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems
necessary
for the performance of its functions." U. N. CHARTER, Art. 22.
1
This sentence was put into the constitution by a 1936 amendment. However,
following the trend of judicial decisions in this country, North Carolina adopted
the doctrine that taxes may be levied only for public purposes in Wood v. Oxford, 97 N. C. 227, 2 S.E. 653 (1887). See McAllister, Public Purpose in Taxation, 18 CpAi.n L. REv. 137 (1930) for a discussion of the history of this doctrine.
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in mind is a public purpose is one of the first hurdles that the governing
body of any municipal corporation must clear in passing on a proposed
tax levy.2
In Nash v. Town of Tarboro3 the question arose whether a municipality pursuant to an act of the Legislature4 could by an ordinance
approved and ratified by a majority of the qualified voters issue
$250,000 in bonds for the construction and operation of a commercial
hotel, the interest and principal of the bonds to be paid by levying annually a sufficient amount of taxes. Held: Judgment of the superior
court denying plaintiff taxpayer's request for injunctive relief, upholding the ordinance and statute, and dismissing the action is reversed. The
construction and operation of a hotel is not a public purpose within the
meaning of Art. V, §3, of the North Carolina Constitution. Therefore
the Legislature is without authority to authorize a municipality to issue
bonds and levy taxes for this project.
"The difficulty, however, arises in deciding what is and what is not
a public purpose." 5 Since the "necessary expenses" of municipal corporations, within the meaning of Art. VII, §7 of the Constitution,
necessarily involve public purposes, the items which have been held to
6
be necessary expenses are per se public purposes.
The following items have been held to be such necessary expenses .
(1) the ordinary expenses of government including salaries, wages and
office expenses; (2) the building and repair of municipal buildings, public roads, streets, bridges, market houses, jetties, abbattoirs,'cemeteries,
sewerage systems, electric light plants, water-works plants, and incinerators; (3) the maintenance of the poor; (4) the maintenance of the
administration of justice; (5) fire insurance for school buildings; (6)
2
Other and related constitutional hurdles, beyond the scope of this note, include:
(1) Restriction of Art. V, §6 (upon state and county only) that "The total of the
State and county tax on property shall not exceed fifteen cents on the one hundred dollars value of property, except when the county property tax is levied for
a special purpose and with the special approval of the General Assembly. . . ."
See Coates and Mitchell, Property and Poll Tax Limitations Under the North
Carolina Constitution, 18 N. C. L. REvi. 275 (1940). An amendment is to be submitted to the people in 1948 to increase this to twenty-five cents. (2) Restriction
of Art. VII; §7 that "No ... municipal corporation shall contract any debt, pledge
its faith or loan its credit, nor shall any tax be levied or collected by any officers
of the same except for the necessary expenses thereof, unless by a vote of the
majority of the qualified voters therein." See Coates and Mitchell, Necessary
Expenses, 18 N. C. L. REv. 93 (1940). (3) Restriction of Art. V, §4 (if *any
debt is to be contracted) which limits the increage of public debts by counties
and municipalities. See Hoyt and Fordham, ConstitutionalRestrictions Upon Public Debt in North Carolina, 16 N. C.*L. Rev. 329 (1938).

3227 N. C. 283, 42 S. E. 2d 209 (1947).

,N. C. Session Laws 1945, c. 413.
' Nash v. Town of Tarboro, 227 N. C. 283, 287, 42 S. E. 2d 209, 211 (1947).
' This is recognized by the court in Nash v. Tarboro, 227 N. C. 283, 287, 42
S. E. 2d 209, 211 (1947), where they list the items.
Es Coates and Mitchell, Necessary Expenses, 18 N. C. L. REv. 93 (1940).
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professional services in refunding bonds;. (7) contract with hospital for
care of indigent sick and afflicted poor.
In addition, the following have been held to be public purposes:
(1) aid to railroads;7 (2) aid to establish a teachers training school;8
(3) railway terminal fadilities ;9 (4) public auditorium ;1o (5) World War
I Veterans' Loan Fund; (6) the state fair ;12 (7) a park;18 (8) a municipal hospital ; :14 (9) an airport;'r (10) port terminal facilities;16 (11)
public housing authority under federal housing acts ;17 (12) playgrounds
and recreational facilities;8 (13) public library;1O and (14) schools.2
'Wood v. Town of Oxford, 97 N. C. 227, 2 S. E. 653 (1887); accord, Caldwell
v. Justices of Burke County, 57 N. C. 323 (1858). On eminent domain see
Raleigh
& G. R. R. v. Davis, 19 N. C. 451 (1837).
8
Cox v. Commissioners, 146 N. C. 584, 60 S. E. 516 (1908) (Pitt County pro-

posed to issue bonds not exceeding $50,000 to aid in establishing what is now
Eastern
Carolina Teachers College).
9
Hudson v. Greensboro, 185 N. C. 502, 117 S. E. 629 (1923), 2 N. C. L. Rav.
38 (1923) (issuance of bonds amounting to $1,300,000 to lend the Southern Railroad the proceeds thereof to build a railway terminal in Greensboro pursuant to
N. C. Priv. L, 1920, c. 105; approved by a vote of the people).
0
" Adams v. Durham, 189 N. C. 232, 126 S. E. 611 (1925) (city proposed to
build a public auditorium using funds derived from the sale of a city lot; not
voted on by the people).
" Hinton v. Lacy, State Treasurer, 193 N. C. 496, 137 S. E. 669 (1927) (state
issued bonds to establish a fund whereby veterans could borrow up to $3,000 to
build homes; this was approved by the voters of North Carolina in 1924 and
again in 1926).
"Briggs v. Raleigh, 195 N. C. 223, 141 S. E. 576 (1928) (N. C. Pub. L. 1927,
c. 209, set aside 200 acres of state land for the purpose of holding a state fair provided the city of Raleigh would donate $75,000 thereto by issuing bonds in that
amount, the issuance of which was authorized by c. 110, upon approval of the
voters of Raleigh. Voters approved. Court held that a state fair was a "public
undertaking" and that its location or retention within five miles of Raleigh made
the bond
issue for a "public municipal purpose.").
"3 Yarborough v. Park Commission, 196 N. C. 284, 145 S. E. 563 (1928)
(issuance of bonds pursuant to N. C. Pub. L. 1927, c. 48, for purchase of part of
land for Smoky Mt. National Park). See note 21 infra.
" Burleson v. Board of Aldermen of Spruce Pine, 200 N. C. 30, 156 S. E. 241
(1930)'
"Greensboro-High Point Airport Authority v. Johnson, 226 N. C. 1, 36 S. E.
2d 803 (1946); Turner v. Reidsville 224 N. C. 42, 29 S. E. 2d 211 (1944);
Goswick v. Durham, 211 N. C. 687, 191 S. E. 728 (1937); cf. Sing v. Charlotte,
213 N. C. 60, 195 S. E. 271 (1937).
6Webb v. Port Commission, 205 N. C. 663, 172 S. E. 377 (1933) (Port Commission was set up as a corporation to construct, maintain and operate port
facilities at Morehead City with power to issue tax exempt bonds.) ; cf. Henderson
v. Wilmington,
191 N. C. 269, 132 S. E. 728 (1926).
"7 Mallard v. Eastern Carolina Housing Authority, 221 N. C. 334, 20 S. E. 2d
281 (1942); Cox v. Kinston, 217 N. C. 391, 8 S. E. 2d 252 (1941); Wells v.
Housing Authority, 213 N. C. 745, 197 S. E. 693 (1938). Also see N. C. GEN.
STAT.
8

(1943) c. 157.

" Atkins v. Durham, 210 N. C. 295, 186 S. E. 330 (1936) (Durham issued
$25,000 in bonds without a vote of the people to acquire land for" public parks
and playgrounds. Held that for a city as populous and industrial as Durham, such
objectives were necessary expenses); Twining v. Wilhington, 214 N. C. 655, 200
S. E. 416 (1939) (parks and playgrounds were not a necessary expense for Wilmington, although they were a public purpose); Brumley v. Baxter, 225 N. C. 691,
36 S. E. 2d 281 (1945) (donation of land by city for recreational centers is
for a public purpose) ; Pursuer v. Ledbetter, Treasurer of Charlotte, 227 N. C. 1,
40 S. E. 2d 702 (1946) (public parks, playgrounds and recreational facilities are
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The North Carolina Court has utilized eminent domain as a test;
i.e., the fact that what is a public purpose for eminent domain is generally also a public purpose for which taxes may-be levied.2 1 However,
the list is not added to as most of the previously mentioned projects
have also been the subject of the eminent domain decisions32
The "custom and usage" test may work both ways.m "In determining whether or not a tax is for a public purpose, when considered in
the light of custom and usage. . . courts should also take into consideration the fact, that a purpose not thereofore considered public but
by reason of changed conditions and circumstances, may be so classified." 24 The court points out by analogy that prior to a 1903 decisionas
water and lights were not considered necessary expenses. Judging from
this declaration and past decisions the expected trend of any change
not a necessary expense, although a public purpose, Atkins v. Durham, supra,
will not "be followed as a precedent").
" Twining v. Wilmington, 214 N. C. 655, 200 S. E. 416 (1939) (public library
not a necessary expense, but by implication it isa public purpose); Westbrook
v. Southern Pines, 215 N. C. 20, 1 S.E. 2d 95 (1939). See N. C. GEN. STAT.
(1943) §§160-75 and 160-77.
"Collie v. Commissioners of Franklin County, 145 N. C. 171, 59 S. E. 44
(1907). For cases on public purpose from other jurisdictions see 51 Am. Jun.
§§342-386, 44 C. J.§4285, 61 C. J.§21; 5 McQunLLEN, MuxcpAL CRPoRATiONs
§§1951-1960, 2325 (rev. ed. 1937).
" Nash v. Town of Tarboro, 227 N. C. 283, 287, 42 S.E. 2d 209, 212 (1947)
("A municipal corporation, however, in the exercise of a proprietary right, just as
in the exercise of a governmental power,. cannot invoke the power of taxation or
the right of eminent domain except for a public purpose."); Charlotte v. Heath,
226 N. C. 750, 40 S. E. 2d 600 (1946) (co'ndemnation case); Yarborough v.
Park Commission, 196 N. C. 284, 145 S. E. 563 (1928) (Plaintiff objected to
proposed bond issue on grounds that acquisition of lands for a national park with
the proceeds was* not a public purpose. Court held that the bonds were for a
public purpose on basis of eminent domain cases and authorities.). Also see
Turner v. Reidsville, 224 N. C. 42, 29 S. E. 2d 211 (1944); Cox v. City of
Kinston, 217 N. C. 391, 8 S.E. 2d 252 (1940); 6 McQuLLzE, MuNmcn'AL CoRPORATIONS §2532 (rev. ed. 1937) (". . . no good reason is apparent why a purpose,
if public as to one [i.e., eminent domain or taxation] is not public as to all.");
51 Am. JuR. §324 ("... in its practical application public use has much the same
meaning in eminent domain that it has in taxation.') ; accord, Cole v. La Grange,
113 U. S. 1 (1885); McBAn, A ERICAN Crv PROGRESS AND THE LAW, c. 5
(1917); JUDsoN, TAXATION §351 (1903); McGEHEE, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 229
(1906).
"2Public ferries' might be added to the list. Willaims v. Commissioners of
Craven County, 119 N. C. 520, 26 S.E. 150 (1896) ; Barrington v. Neuse River
Ferry Co., 69 N. C. 165 (1875). For material approaching the subject from the
eminent domain angle see Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of
Eminent Domain, 20 B. U. L. Rxv. 615 (1940) ; Note, 21 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rxv. 285
(1946).
" Prior decisions have been held to be of little weight. City of Tombstone v.
Macia, 30 Ariz. 218, 245 Pac. 677 (1927) ("We should not be controlled to too
great an extent by decisions of courts in climates far distant from ours . . . [or
which] ...come from a remote time, and therefore may be out of tune with modem conditions.").
." Nash v. Town of Tarboro, 227 N. C. 283, 287, 42 S.E. 2d 209, 212 (1947) (this
custom and usage idea was adopted from Loan & Savings Association v. Topeka,
87 U. S.655 (1874)).
" Fawcett v. Mount Airy, 134 N. C. 125, 45 S.E. 1029 (1903).
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would be towards increasing the favored objectives. However, using
the suggested necessary expense analogy one finds that in 1936 recreational facilities in industrial Durham were held to be a necessary expense26 but after chipping away at this holding T the court decided in
194628 that such facilities are not necessary expenses.
Justice Barnhill's definition of public purpose is: "It must be a corporate purpose directly connected with the local government and having
for its objective the promotion of the public health, safety, morals, general welfare, security, prosperity or contentment of the inhabitants or
residents within the political division from whence the revenue for its
support is derived."' 9 Such a statement is loaded with terms over
which reasonable men may disagree. The citizens of Tarboro, faced
with a situation where private enterprise had broken down in that the
only hotel for its 8,000 people was "obsolete" and bore a "poor reputation,"30 thought a hotel would promote the "general welfare and convenience of both the residents and transients ... and.., the economic
interests of the town." 31 The trial judge so found. The court's answer
was "but ordinarily such benefits will be considered too incidental to
justify the expenditure of public funds." 32 Thus, the presence of only
one or two of Justice Barnhill's criteria may be insufficient. Or, as
one authority states: "Hardly any project of public benefit is without
some element of peculiar personal profit to individuals, hardly any private attempt to use the taxing power is without some colorable pretext
of public good. Each case must be judged on its own facts, and any
attempt at fixed definition must result in confusion and contradictions."83
Another test utilized in the principal case was whether the object
under scrutiny would be exempt from taxation by virtue of that part
of Art. V. §3,'N. C. Constitution which provides that "property belonging to the state or to municipal corporations" must be exempt.84 This
has been construed to mean only property held for a public purpose.36
"Atldns v. Durham, 210 N. C. 295, 186 S. E. 330 (1936).
28

Twining v. Wilmington, 214 N. C. 655, 200 S. E. 416 (1939).
Pursuer v. Ledbetter, 227 N. C. 1, 40 S. E. 2d 702 (1946).

See note 18

Concurring in part and dissenting in part in Greensboro-High Point Airport
Authority v. Johnson, 226 N. C. 1, 36 S. E. 2d 803 (1946).

'oTranscript of Record, p. 10, Nash v. Town of Tarboro, 227 N. C. 283,
42 S.
1 E. 2d 209 (1947).
3

Id. at 7.

Nash v. Town of Tarboro, 227 N. C. 283, 290, 42 S.E. 2d 209, 214 (1947).
6 MCQUILLEN, Muracnx. CoapoRATIoNs §2532 (rev. ed. 1937).
"Nash v. Town of Tarboro, 227 N. C. 283, 289, 42 S. E. 2d 209, 213 (1947).
"Winston-Salem v. Forsyth County, 217 N. C. 704, 9 S. E. 2d 381 (1940) ;
Warrenton v. Warren County, 215 N. C. 342, 2 S.E. 464 (1939); Town of
Weaverville v. Hobbs, Commissioner, 212 N. C. 684, 194 S.E. 860 (1937) ; Benson v. Johnston County, 209 N. C. 751, 185 S.E. 6 (1935) ; Board of Financial
Control v. Heiderson County, 208 N. C. 569, 181 S. E. 636 (1935).

For a

thorough discussion of these cases see Coates, The Battle of Exemptionw, 19 N. C.
L. RzV. 154 (1941).
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But this argument goes in a circle. Thus, Warrenton v. Warren
County 8 decided that a hotel acquired by a town to protect an investment was taxable by the county because the hotel was not held for a
public purpose.
In cases of this type, it is probable that public policy as the court
sees it is often the factor that tips the scales one way or the other. The
court in the instant case quotes from two cases that take the traditional
viewpoint. The first is an 1874 decision3 7 of the United States Supreme
Court to the effect that a city bond issue to donate money to a private
iron works was not a public purpose.3 s The second is an 1887 Kentucky case3 9 in which it was said: "Certainly, a tax could not be constitutionally levied to aid one in building or conducting a hotel; and to
exempt the keeper from the payment of the tax thereon is but doing
indirectly what cannot be done directly."
Although the question in the principal case was not whether Tarboro could give public money to a private corporation to build a hotel,
but whether Tarboro could erect and operate its own hotel, the underlying question of public policy is analogous. However, the United
States Supreme Court has, without overruling the 1874 case, taken a
broader view in a 1920 decision4" allowing the State of North Dakota
to set up state enterprises to manufacture and market farm products,
to provide homes for residents, and to establish a state bank and in a
1927 decision 41 upholding the right of the City of Lincoln, Nebraska,
to establish a municipal filling station which operated at cost. The more
recent state decisions "indicate a tendency to ... broaden the scope of

those activities involving a public purpose in which a state or its political
subdivisions may lawfully engage."4
Nor is the enactment of the legislature authorizing the project sufficient in North Carolina. "In. its final analysis, it is a question for the
courts." 43 The United States Supreme Court has in recent years devela6215 N. C. 342, 2 S.E. 2d 464 (1939).
s Savings & Loan Association v. Topeka, 87 U. S. 655 (1874).
3 See McAllister, supra note 1 for discussion of this case.
"Lancaster v. Clayton, 86 Ky. 373. 5 S. W. 864 (1887).
,0
253 U. S. 233 (1920) Note 29 YALE L. J. 933 (1920).
'1 Standard Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 114 Neb. 243, 207 N. W. 962, aff'd
w .in,275 U. S.504 (1927), Note 41 HARv. L. REv. 775 (1928).
See Note, 115 A. L. R. 1459 (1938).
Nash v.Town of Tarboro, 227 N. C. 283, 286, 42 S.E. 2d 209, 211 (1947)
(court cites this phrase from Briggs v. Raleigh, 195 N. C. 223, 141 S. E. 597
(1928)). Similar language is used in many other cases. Turner v. Reidsville,
224 N. C. 42, 29 S. E. 2d 211 (1944); Wells v. Housing Authority, 213 N. C.
745, 197 S.E. 693 (1938); Yarborough v. Park Commission, 196 N. C. 284, 145
S. E. 563 (1928) ; Hinton v. Lacy, State Treasurer, 193 N. C. 496, 137 S.E. 669
(1927) ; Stratford v. Greensboro, 124,N. C. 127, 32 S. E. 394 (1899). But cf.
Hudson v. Greensboro, 185 N. C. 502, 516, 117 S. E. 629, 636 (1923) ("It was
earnestly argued before us that the proposition that . . . Greensboro should loan
this fund would impair its credit, that the issue of over a million dollars in bonds
by a city for the purposes recited [to loan to Southern Railroad to build a terminal
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oped a broader view, stating: "When Congress has spoken on this subject [what is a public purpose] its decision is entitled to deference until
it is shown to involve an impossibility. Any departure from this judicial
restraint would result in courts deciding on what is and what is not a
governmental function and in their invalidating legislation on the basis
of their view on that question at the moment of decision, a practice
4
which has proved impracticable in other fields.""1
NoEL

R.

S. WOODHOUSE.

Negotiable Instruments-Adoption of Printed Seal
Suit was brought on a "note or bond" set out in detail in the complaint with the usual allegations of demand and non-payment. 1 The
copy of the note disclosed the printed word "Seal" at the right of defendant maker's signature but there was no recital such as "Witness
my hand and seal." 2 The answer admitted execution of the instrument
set out in the complaint and pleaded the statute of limitations, "Said notes
not bearing the seal of ... defendants and were more than three years
past due prior to the bringing of this action." 3 The trial judge excluded
defendant's evidence that he neither sealed the note nor understood the
significance of nor adopted the printed word as his seal.4 He also declined to submit any issue on the question of defendant's intent to adopt
the word as his seal.5 Moreover in his charge to the jury the judge
referred to the instrument as a bond.6
Thus hedged in and his instrument judicially classified against him,
the defendant lost at trial and on appeal claimed the rulings and charge
of the trial judge to have been error. That, if erroneous, they had been
prejudicial could not be doubted.
The North Carolina Supreme Court in affirming said that after
defendant had admitted. executing the instruments set out by plaintiff it
would violate the parol evidence rule to admit evidence that they were
in city] was not only novel . . . and that the precedent thus set, if followed to any
extent, would not serve the public interest. But these are nwt matters which are
confided to this branch of the government.").
" United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 U. S. 546
(1946) (case related to taking of land in Swain County, N. C., by the T. V. A.).
But see the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Reed.
IBell v. Chadwick, N. C. Super. Ct., May term, Craven County, 1946.
2Id. Fall term, 1946, North Carolina Supreme Court, record on appeal, p. 3.
It seems to be settled that the recital when present will conclusively establish the
adoption of the printed word Seal. Jefferson Std. Life Ins. Co. v. Morehead, 209
N. C. 174, 176, 183 S. E. 606, 607 (1936), semble. Cf. Churchill v. Speight's
Extrs., 3 N. C. 338 (1805).
'Record, pp. 7, 8. As to the .necessity of pleading the facts see Murray v.
Barden, 132 N. C. 136, 43 S. E. 600 (1903) and other cases in N. C. DIGEST,
Limitatiofi of Actions, §183(2).
'Record, pp. 21-23.
Record, p. 24.
Record, p. 25.

